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Abstract
We investigate claims about the frequency of “know” made by philosophers. Our
investigation has several overlapping aims. First, we aim to show what is required to
confirm or disconfirm philosophers’ claims about the comparative frequency of dif-
ferent uses of philosophically interesting expressions. Second, we aim to show how
using linguistic corpora as tools for investigating meaning is a productive methodol-
ogy, in the sense that it yields discoveries about the use of language that philosophers
would have overlooked if they remained in their “armchairs of an afternoon”, to use
J.L. Austin’s phrase. Third, we discuss facts about the meaning of “know” that so
far have been ignored in philosophy, with the aim of reorienting discussions of the
relevance of ordinary language for philosophical theorizing.
1 Philosophers and observations about “ordinary” use
Observations about what we “ordinarily” or “typically” or “most commonly” mean by
some expression of interest have been a staple of philosophical practice at least since the
heyday of ordinary language philosophy in the 1950s.1 For example, here are contemporary
examples of philosophers making frequency claims about how people ordinarily talk about
someone knowing something:
∗Thanks to Zed Adams, Emmanuel Chemla, Alex Davies, Mark Dingemanse, Dan Harris, Shen-yi Liao,
Eliot Michaelson, David Plunkett, Chris Potts, Sebastian Schuster, members of the Linguistics and Philoso-
phy workshop at the University of Chicago, the Zu¨rich Doctoral Workshop on ordinary language philosophy,
and the symposium on metapragmatics at the 2019 Central APA for very helpful comments. Kent Bach very
generously discussed the content of the paper and his own view about “know” with us in detail. Anonymous
referees provided helpful and constructive comments. This research was supported by Leverhulme Research
Project Grant RPG-2016-193 and by an External Faculty Fellowship and a Geballe Fellowship at the Stanford
Humanities Center.
1For a sample drawn from JSTOR, see the Appendix.
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Also, it is worth keeping in mind that most of the time, outside of epistemol-
ogy, when we consider whether somebody knows something, we are mainly in-
terested in whether the person has the information, not in whether the person’s
belief rises to the level of knowledge. Ordinarily we do not already assume that
they have a true belief and just focus on whether or not their epistemic posi-
tion suffices for knowing. Similarly, when we say that someone does not know
something, typically we mean that they don’t have the information. (Bach,
2005a, pp. 62–63)
‘I know that such and such’ is far more commonly used in situations in which
the obtaining of such and such is not in question and no one is in need of being
assured of it. Think, for example, of the ‘I know’ of sharing a reaction to a
piece of purported news, or the ‘I know’ of acknowledging a significant fact.
(Baz, 2012, p. 40)
Both Bach and Baz make frequency claims about knowledge claims or uses of “I know
that such and such”, and use those observations in support of methodological claims about
how best to investigate knowledge. Bach argues that because the knowledge claims of
ordinary speakers aren’t usually about “whether or not their epistemic position suffices for
knowing”, the use of such judgments is not a reliable guide to the nature of knowledge that
philosophers care about, which is about what kind of epistemic position is sufficient for
knowing. Baz, in contrast, argues for the position that because the philosophical use of “I
know that such and such” diverges substantially from the much more common use of that
phrase, judgments about the philosophical use do not tell us anything about the ordinary
use of “I know that such and such”—they only tell us about philosophical “lu¨ftgeba¨ude”
(houses of cards) detached from anything that we would ordinarily care about (Baz, 2015,
p. 13).2
The central aim of this paper is to answer the following question: What would justify
philosophers’ frequency claims about how people ordinarily talk? Tversky and Kahneman
(1973) and a wave of subsequent research have made it clear that our frequency judgments
sometimes do not track objective frequencies, so we should be skeptical of armchair claims
about how common certain uses are in ordinary situations. Baz’s judgment that one partic-
ular use of “I know that such and such” is more frequent than another might be the result
of that use being more easily recalled, rather than it being genuinely more frequent, for
example.
Fortunately for the philosopher of language, however, there now exist resources to in-
vestigate objective frequencies of occurrences of linguistic expressions, namely linguistic
corpora, which are organized bodies of text, purpose-built for answering linguistic ques-
tions, such as what the comparative frequencies of various expressions are (Bluhm, 2016,
p. 91).3 Sæbo (2004, p. 200) sets out the reasons for supplementing and correcting armchair
linguistic judgments with linguistic corpora:
2Baz’s talk of “lu¨ftgeba¨ude” is an allusion to Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, §118.
3An early example of a corpus study of [know] is Ludlow (2005), which uses the results of Google
searches involving the various modifiers that can combine with [know] as a way of challenging claims about
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It will be seen that a corpus can force us to revise old hypotheses and that it
can inspire new ones. Corpora offer an insurance against nocuous idealizations
[covert simplifications of facts, hidden behind selected data], where relevant
aspects are disregarded and core facts are missed, by laying bare the relation
between raw and interpreted data so it is open for inspection; and they offer a
constructive means of assisting the imagination, guiding the researcher towards
facts which would otherwise not be thought of.
In this paper, we investigate philosophers’ claims about the frequency of talk about
knowledge using linguistic corpora, with a focus on the Corpus of Contemporary American
English, which is “composed of more than 520 million words in 220,225 texts” and which
is “evenly divided between. . . five genres of spoken, fiction, popular magazines, newspa-
pers, and academic journals”.4 By scouring COCA and other corpora, we can improve on
armchair methods of judging the frequency of expressions of philosophical interest (such
as “know”).
2 How frequent is “know”?
How do people use “know” when they are speaking and writing (and not doing philoso-
phy)? As Jennifer Nagel observes, “know” is one of the most commonly used verbs in
spoken English:
In spoken English (as measured most authoritatively, by the 450-million-word
Corpus of Contemporary American English5), ‘know’ and ‘think’ figure as
the sixth and seventh most commonly used verbs, muscling out what might
seem to be more obvious contenders like ‘get’ and ‘make’. Spoken English
is deeply invested in knowing, easily outshining other genres on this score.
In academic writing, for example, ‘know’ and ‘think’ are only the 17th and
22nd-most popular verbs, well behind the scholar’s pallid friends ‘should’ and
‘could’. To be fair, some of the conversational traffic in ‘know’ is coming
from fixed phrases, like—you know— invitations to conversational partners to
make some inference, or—I know—indications that you are accepting what
what sorts of arguments exist in the logical form of [know]. More recently, Vetter (2014) uses corpus data
to challenge philosophers’ informal judgments about the meaning of disposition ascriptions (“disposed to”),
Fischer et al. (2015) looks at the distribution of the perception verbs “appears”, “looks”, and “seems” in a
corpus for evidence of what those expressions mean, Liao et al. (2016) cites corpus data about the relative
infrequency with which aesthetic adjectives occur with “for-” phrases in support of an argument that aes-
thetic adjectives behave differently than relative adjectives, and Andow (2015) uses corpora to investigate
the changing frequency of the expression “intuition” as used by philosophers. While this paper was in press,
Pinillos and Nichols (2018), Sytsma et al. (2019), and Meija-Ramos et al. (2019), all which make use of
corpora to investigate philosophical questions, were published.
4 http://corpus.byu.edu/coca/
5The size of COCA has grown since Nagel wrote this passage—it currently contains more than 520
million words.
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conversational partners are saying. But even after we strip out those formu-
laic uses, the database’s randomly sampled conversations remain thickly larded
with genuine references to knowing and thinking.6
Nagel uses these frequency facts to back up the idea that investigating “know” and what it
(presumably) refers to, namely knowledge, is of central human importance.7 But the fact
that “know” occurs relatively frequently in human speech and writing only lends support
to the epistemologist’s hope that “know” and knowledge are of widespread concern if most
or some significant proportion of those occurrences of “know” are being used in a way
continuous with the epistemologist’s use. Nagel acknowledges this assumption when she
points out that some of the occurrences of “know” in the corpus she is relying on (COCA)
are not being used in a way that is continuous with the epistemologist’s use—namely, the
discourse marker use (what Nagel calls “fixed phrases”) of “you know” and “I know”.
A terminological note, and some comments on Nagel’s frequency claims When Nagel
refers to the frequency of a word like “know”, she is not just talking about the frequency of
a particular string (k n o w), but to all forms of the common base form, or lemma, for the
verb “know”, namely:
• know
• knew
• known
• knows
• knowing
• knowed (this is the regularized version of the irregular past tense “knew”)
In COCA, it is possible to search for all of the forms of the lemma for “know” by putting the
expression in brackets: [know]. For that reason, from now on we will adopt the convention,
when talking about all of the verb forms of “know”, of putting the expression in brackets.8
So, for example, [be] is the most common verb lemma (with forms including “is”, “was”,
“be”, “were”, “am”, etc.) followed by [have], and then [do]. The raw counts for all of the
6https://blog.oup.com/2014/09/what-commuters-know-vsi/.
7Similar observations are made by Pinillos (2012, p. 193) and Michael Hannon:
https://talkinghumanities.blogs.sas.ac.uk/2018/05/29/
whats-point-knowledge-post-truth-era/. Behind these observations is the assumption
“that lexical frequency will correlate with cultural prominence” (San Roque et al. 2015, p. 6). But that
assumption can’t be correct as it stands, since it’s implausible that “the”—by far the most common word in
English—has any special cultural prominence (other than to analytic philosophers of language). Thanks to
Chris Kennedy for this observation.
8Baz (2012, p. 12 and passim) frequently refers to “know” and its “cognates” when he intends to refer to
“know”, “knows”, “known”, etc.. But a cognate of a word is just something that shares the same etymological
origin. “Shirt” and “skirt” are cognates, for example, both being derived from the Old English “skyrte” (a
tunic). It is therefore preferable, when investigating the various forms of “know”, to refer to the different
forms of the lemma [know], rather than to “know” and its cognates.
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forms of the top 12 most frequent verb lemmas in COCA are the following:9
1. [be] 20,345,475
2. [have] 6,474,715
3. [do] 3,408,919
4. [say] 2,538,688
5. [go] 1,530,661
6. [will] 1,435,282
7. [can] 1,344,061
8. [get] 1,317,745
9. [know] 1,213,282
10. [would] 1,209,395
11. [make] 1,133,929
12. [think] 983,539
Note that these counts are for COCA as a whole, which includes both transcripts of
speech and written texts (newspapers, magazines, fiction, and academic texts). In the spo-
ken part of COCA, [know] is the sixth most frequent verb. Nagel observes that the relative
frequency of [know] is much greater in spoken English than it is in academic texts, which
comes across clearly in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Comparison of frequencies of [know] between the spoken and academic sections
of COCA
9For a different list of lemmatized verbs ordered by frequency, see http://ucrel.lancs.ac.uk/
bncfreq/lists/5_2_all_rank_verb.txt, which is based on the British National Corpus ([know]
is #12 on that list).
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What would explain this substantial difference in the frequency of [know] in speech
vs. academic writing? As Nagel points out, some of the occurrences of “know” in speech
come from “formulaic” “fixed phrases”, like “you know” and “I know”, which are what
linguists would call pragmatic markers or discourse markers, which, you know, probably
don’t occur as frequently in academic writing.10
The fact that discourse uses of [know] occur more frequently in spoken than in written
English prompts two further questions, which we can use the corpus to try to answer:
Q1 How frequent are discourse marking uses of [know] in speech, compared to academic
writing?
Q2 Once the discourse marking uses of [know] are excluded, how far does [know] drop
down the list of the most frequently occurring verbs in English?
If it turns out that the frequency of [know] in speech is mostly due to the frequency of
discourse marking uses, that should weaken the appeal of the epistemologist’s idea that
the frequency of [know] tells us something important about the centrality of knowledge
in ordinary people’s lives. By looking at random samples of occurrences of [know] that
occur in transcribed speech, we can get a rough idea of the proportion of those occurrences
that are discourse marking uses, as opposed to what Nagel calls “genuine references to
knowing”.
A random sample drawn from COCA of 500 occurrences of [know] in spoken English
yielded 254 discourse marking uses—over 50% of all occurrences of [know].11 Here are
two examples of discourse marking uses of [know]:
(1) And I’m hopeful that some of these viable candidates like Rubio, you know, maybe
Walker, maybe Bush will be able to capitalize on this as an opportunity to show,
you know, what Donald Trump really is and actually stand up for what the party is
pushing forward which is brighter future for America.12
(2) Well, Dr. Drew, what bothers me the most is when Anahita said that innocent
people need attorneys, too. I mean, she could have nip this in the butt and just said,
“You know what, distance myself from my husband. I don’t know—you know, I
am in no way a part of this, and let the investigation conduct on it’s own”.13
In contrast, in a random sample of 500 occurrences of [know] drawn from academic
writing, only 8 were discourse marking uses, all of which appeared in direct quotations of
speech, such as the following:
10For an overview of theories of discourse markers, see Schiffrin (2001).
11All of the random samples discussed in this paper were selected using the “find sample” function on
COCA, which selects a random sample from a specified set of examples drawn from the corpus—for example,
you can select a random sample of occurrences of [know] drawn from the spoken part of the corpus.
12Date: 2015 (150711); Title: “Donald Trump”; Source: SPOK: CNN.
13Date: 2014 (140715); Title: “Hot Car Child Death Case”; Source: SPOK: CNN.
6
(3) “I’ve got a very addictive personality, I was told, ya know, maybe that has some-
thing to do with it”.14
That aligns with the following observation made by Erman (2001, p. 1339):
[Discourse markers] are all restricted to spoken language (or mimetic dia-
logue). . .
The adjusted ranking of the most common verbs in the spoken component of COCA,
excluding discourse marker uses from the [know] count, therefore runs as follows:
1. [be] 6,055,987
2. [have] 1,664,956
3. [do] 1,276,348
4. [go] 671,571
5. [say] 573,359
6. [get] 487,694
7. [think] 483,586
8. [will] 397,824
9. [can] 342,526
10. [would] 304,046
11? [know]–estimated non-discourse markers 296,411–247,92815
12? [see]—estimated non-discourse markers 253,297–247,03216
13? [make] 250,314
14? [want] 249,865
14Date: 2006 (Fall); Publication information: Fall2006, Vol. 36 Issue 4, p787-808, 22p; Title: “INI-
TIATION TO PHARMACEUTICAL OPIOIDS AND PATTERNS OF MISUSE: PRELIMINARY QUAL-
ITATIVE FINDINGS OBTAINED BY THE OHIO SUBSTANCE ABUSE MONITORING NETWORK”;
Author: Daniulaityte, Raminta / Carlson, Robert G. / Kenne, Deric R.; Source: ACAD: Journal of Drug
Issues.
15Using confidence interval calculations based on our sample, we can be 95% confident that the number
of all classifications of [know], excluding discourse marking uses of [know], is within this range (in the
spoken portion of COCA). In the sample of 500 occurrences of [know] drawn from the spoken English part
of COCA (which contains 553,191 occurrences of [know] total), 50.8% of the occurrences of [know] were
discourse markers: margin of error = 4.38%; confidence interval = 46.4% – 55.2%. Note that according to
Cumming and Maillardet (2006), this 95% confidence interval corresponds to an 83.4% capture percentage.
That is, there is a 83.4% chance that a repetition of this experiment would produce a mean that falls within
the original confidence interval (see Cumming and Maillardet, 2006 for a description of capture percentages).
Thanks to Shen-yi Liao for discussion of this issue.
16There is also a discourse marking use of [see]—“you see”—that is similar to the discourse marker “you
know”. We sampled 500 random occurrences of [see] taken from the 255,270 total occurrences of [see] in the
spoken part of the corpus, and found 10 examples of discourse marking uses (2%). Using confidence interval
calculations based on our sample, we can be 95% confident that the number of all likely classifications of
[see] as non-discourse markers in the spoken portion of COCA, is within the range give in the list: margin of
error = 1.23%; confidence interval = 0.77% – 3.23%. Thanks to an anonymous referee for asking about the
frequency of other discourse markers besides [know].
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It’s important not to put too much weight on the significance of the downgrading of
[know] from #6 to #11–14 on this ranking, but Nagel’s claim that [know] occurs more
frequently than [get] and [make] depends on counting uses of [know] that are discourse
markers, which are not, by Nagel’s own lights, genuine references to knowing. But what
are “genuine references to knowing”?
3 “Genuine references to knowing”
Philosophers have analyzed the existence of several different types of knowledge associated
with different types of complements of the verb [know]:
• propositional knowledge, associated with a that-clause, or a sentential complement
(“I know that it’s sunny”; “I know it’s sunny”)
• knowledge-wh, associated with an embedded question expressed by a wh-expression
(“I know when the grocery store closes”, “I know who killed Kennedy”, “I know
how to cold brew coffee”)
• objectual knowledge, associated with a noun phrase complement (“I know her”; “I
know Wyeth”)
Propositional knowledge has received an enormous amount of attention from philoso-
phers (for an overview, see Ichikawa and Steup 2017). Very briefly, philosophers have
been concerned with how to characterize knowledge as a relation between a subject and a
proposition: is the relation one of justified true belief? Is the relation context sensitive in
some way? Is it sensitive to the interests of the knower? Is it unanalyzable? We will take
a close look at propositional knowledge in the second part of this paper, when we come
to evaluate the Bach and Baz frequency claims mentioned in §1. In this section, we will
examine how frequent cases of talk about propositional knowledge are in relation to other
types of knowledge-talk.
Knowledge-wh has been analyzed by some philosophers as being a form of proposi-
tional knowledge: “S knows wh-” is truth-conditionally equivalent to “there is a propo-
sition p such that x knows that p, and p (truly) answers the indirect question of the wh-
clause” (Brogaard 2009, p. 439, summarizing the views of Bach 2005, Braun 2006 and
Higginbotham 1996). Schaffer (2007) and Brogaard (2009) argue against the reduction
of knowledge-wh to propositional knowledge. A special case of knowledge-wh that has
been the subject of a great deal of philosophical debate is knowledge-how. Stanley and
Williamson (2001) and Stanley (2011) offer a detailed (but contentious) account of knowledge-
how and its relation to semantic theories of embedded questions and knowledge-wh.17
Objectual knowledge is a relation between a subject and a non-propositional object.
Roughly, someone knows an object when they stand in some appropriate psychological
relation (sometimes called acquaintance) to the relevant object.18 While it is the “default
17Objections to Stanley and Williamson’s “intellectualist” theory of knowledge-how are set out in Brown-
stein and Michaelson (2016), Fridland (2015), Glick (2013), and Rumfitt (2003).
18For a survey of competing conceptions of the appropriate psychological relation of acquaintance, see
Hasan and Fumerton (2014, §2).
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view” that the [know] that appears in propositional knowledge and knowledge-wh involves
the same meaning, facts about cross-linguistic variation indicate that the [know] of ob-
jectual knowledge and the [know] of propositional knowledge and knowledge-wh have
different meanings (Goddard and Wierzbicka 1994, pp. 31–32; Jary and Stainton 2017,
p. 482; Nagel 2014, p. 6; Stanley 2011, p. 36). In Table 1, for example, French, German
and Spanish each use one verb to translate propositional knowledge and knowledge-wh
(savoir, saber, wissen), and another verb to translate objectual knowledge (connaıˆtre, cono-
cer, kennen). That kind of cross-linguistic variation is evidence that English [know] can
have different meanings.19
Table 1: Cross-linguistic evidence that objectual [know] and propositional [know] /
[know]-wh have different meanings
English French Spanish German
I know that it’s sunny Je sais que c’est ensoleille´ Se´ que hace sol Ich weiss, dass es sonnig ist
I know who did it Je sais qui l’a fait Yo se´ quie´n lo hizo Ich weiss, wer es getan hat
I know what time it is Je sais a` quelle heure il est Se´ que´ hora es Ich weiss, wie spa¨t es ist
I know Wyeth Je connais Wyeth Conozco a Wyeth Ich kenne Wyeth
I know Prague Je connais Prague Conozco Praga Ich kenne Prag
I know the killer* Je connais le tueur Conozco al asesino Ich kenne den Mo¨rder
* Note that “I know the killer” is ambiguous in English between an objectual reading and a “concealed
question” reading, on which it means “I know who the killer is” (Heim, 1979). As Heim points out
(p. 51), when a noun phrase object is permitted with the verb “wissen” in German, it unambiguously
gets a concealed question reading, as in “Ich weiss den Mo¨rder schon” (I already know who the killer is)
(Engelen, 2010, p. 160). See §4, below, for further discussion of concealed questions.
In terms of frequency counts, the ambiguity of English [know] is important, because
the frequency of [know] in English will lump together uses that would be distinguished in
languages like French, Spanish and German. In the Corpus de Espan˜ol (Web / Dialects),
for instance, the Spanish word for propositional knowledge and knowledge-wh, [saber],
ranks 15th among verb lemmas, while the word for objectual knowledge, [conocer], ranks
25th.20 If combined, the counts for the two Spanish verbs for knowledge would rank 10th,
similar to the rank of [know] in English. This comparison should be taken with a large grain
of salt, since it is not possible to make a one-to-one comparison of English and Spanish,
especially when it comes to something like a ranking of the most common verbs. For
example, Spanish has two verbs for the English [be] (ser and estar), and both are in the
top ten Spanish verb lemmas, while no Spanish word directly translates to the English
[get], which in Spanish might be expressed with llevar, tener, or traer. The upshot of
these cross-linguistic facts is that the [know] that is of primary interest to epistemologists
(propositional knowledge and know-wh), is not as frequent as it may appear from a quick
inspection of English corpora because a substantial portion of the overall occurrences of
19English isn’t alone in this respect; Russian znaht’, for example, is similarly applicable to both objectual
and propositional knowledge/knowledge-wh.
20http://www.corpusdelespanol.org/web-dial/
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[know] are (a) objectual occurrences of [know] (which have a different meaning), and (b)
discourse marking uses of [know], which are not “genuine references to knowing”.
4 How to determine relative frequencies of different types of “genuine references to
knowing”
Suppose we wanted to determine what proportion of occurrences of [know] refer to propo-
sitional knowledge and and knowledge-wh, and what proportion refer to objectual knowl-
edge. How would we do that? One possibility would be to see if it possible to get a
rough sense of the relative frequency of what Nagel calls “genuine references to know-
ing” by counting the frequency of [know] + complement combinations that characterize
knowledge that, knowledge-wh and objectual knowledge. For example, searching for verb
forms of [know], followed by a noun, yields a list of examples of what look like objectual
knowledge:
1. know people
2. know things
3. knew things
4. knew people
5. know god
6. know shit
7. know John
8. know Jack
9. know women
10. know right
But even a cursory inspection of the examples that contribute to generating this ranking
reveals that some of the occurrences of [know] + noun are actually examples of proposi-
tional knowledge, such as the following, where there is no explicit “that”-clause, but only
a sentential complement:
(4) I didn’t know people still talked that way.21
(5) And I know women will continue to pay close attention to all of this.22
For the same reason, while searching for “[know] + that” reliably yields examples of
propositional knowledge, such a search will miss all occurrences of propositional knowl-
edge that lack a “that”-clause.23 In a random sample of 100 occurrences of [know], the
number of examples of propositional knowledge was roughly divided between those with
explicit “that”-clauses (12 occurrences) and those without (15 occurrences). A search that
21Date: 2015; Publication information: Jan/Feb2015, Vol. 128 Issue 1/2, p129-149. 21p; Title: History’s
Best Places to Kiss; Author: Houser, Nik; Source: FIC: Fantasy & Science Fiction.
22Date: 2014 (140212); Title: PBS NewsHour for February 12, 2014; Source: SPOK: PBS.
23Searching for “[know] + that” will occasionally turn up examples of anaphoric uses of “that” which refer
back to knowledge-wh or objectual knowledge.
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targets explicit “that”-clauses could therefore be missing more than 50% of examples of
propositional knowledge.
Searches for one or two types of words, then, prove inadequate for reliably distin-
guishing between different forms of [know]. What about more complicated grammatical
structures? For instance, propositional uses of [know] should in theory involve clausal
complements—the part of the sentence which follows the “that”, as in:
(6) You know that I think of him like a son.24
To test this idea, we used Stanford’s CoreNLP parsing program to detect the presence
of clausal complements in a sample of 100 occurrences sentences featuring [know] that we
had already tagged as propositional, objectual, and so forth.25 One potential advantage with
such an approach is that clausal complements are detectable even when the word “that” is
missing. For example, in the original version of the example above, the speaker did not say
“that”, but CoreNLP still identifies “he didn’t get along fine” as a clausal complement gov-
erned by “know”. As a result, this parsing might help us identify propositional knowledge
claims that simpler searches would miss. Table 2 gives the results produced by the parser,
for sentences that we hand coded as propositional.
Table 2: Presence and absence of clausal complements for sentences hand coded as cases
of propositional knowledge
Has Clausal Complement Does Not Have Clausal Complement
Propositional 15 11
As Table 2 reveals, targeting clausal complements governed by “know” is an improve-
ment over the simpler searches, but not by much—it still misses about 40% of the uses
hand coded as propositional. As a few examples show, these are not particularly unusual
or complicated sentences, but they have features, like anaphoric “[know] this” or “[know]
that”, or a [know] parenthetical (“as every parent knows”), that block the application of a
purely syntactic criterion as a way of identifying propositional occurrences of [know]:
(7) But now she knows this: EeDee came down from the highsky in a silver ship to
bring no good to the World.26
(8) However, as every parent knows, kids are great at finding loopholes and at persuad-
ing us to do for them what they do not want to do for themselves.27
24Date 2015 Publication information New York : St. Martin’s Press, Edition: First edition. Title Blueprints
Author Delinsky, Barbara, Source FIC: Blueprints
25Specifically, we used the “coreNLP” package in CRAN (Manning et al., 2014). Sentences containing
[know] were annotated and parsed for dependencies. The CoreNLP program is available here: https:
//stanfordnlp.github.io/CoreNLP/. Thanks to Sebastian Schuster for suggesting this approach.
26Date: 2015; Publication Information: May/June 2015, Vol. 128 Issue 5/6, p7-29. 23p. 1 Illustration;
Title: Teardrop; Author: Mason, Lisa; Source: FIC: Fantasy & Science Fiction.
27Date: 2015; Publication Information: Sep2015, Vol. 144 Issue 2844, p68-69. 2p.; Title: School Morning
Madness; Author: Cortes, Ivana; Source: MAG: USA Today Magazine.
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(9) Did you know that?28
The propositional nature of a knowledge claim does not require the presence of a clausal
complement governed by “know”, or, based on our examination of the CoreNLP parses,
any other obvious features that can be identified purely syntactically.
A further complication in trying to use syntactic criteria to identify types of knowledge
is the existence of “concealed questions”. As mentioned in the note accompanying Table
(1), above, sentences that combine certain attitude verbs (like [know]) with nominal com-
plements can be ambiguous between objectual knowledge readings and readings on which
they are equivalent to knowledge-wh readings, as in the following example:
(10) Kim knows the governor of California. (Frana, 2017, p. 1)
Sentence (10) can be understood as saying either that Kim is acquainted with the governor
of California (which can be the case even if she doesn’t recognize that the person she’s ac-
quainted with is the governor of California), or as saying that Kim knows who the governor
of California is (which doesn’t require being acquainted with that person).
Heim (1979) proposes “paraphrasability by a wh-clause” as a heuristic for distinguish-
ing concealed question readings of [know] + noun phrase constructions from objectual
readings, and she also provides an entailment test for distinguishing the two readings.29
The following argument is valid on the objectual reading of [knows] + NP, and invalid on
the concealed question reading:
1. Kim knows the governor of California.
2. The governor of California is a supporter of high speed rail.
C. Kim knows a supporter of high speed rail.
If Kim is acquainted with the governor of California, and he is a supporter of high speed
rail, then Kim is also acquainted with a supporter of high speed rail. But if Kim knows who
the governor of California is, it doesn’t follow from the fact that the governor of California
is a supporter of high speed rail that Kim knows who a supporter of high speed rail is. Given
that the ways of distinguishing a concealed question from a case of objectual knowledge
require assessing paraphrasability and entailment, there will be no purely syntactic test
for distinguishing the two uses of [know], and classification will depend on semantic and
pragmatic judgments about which reading is more plausible given the surrounding context
of each occurrence.
One of the major hurdles in any quantitative humanities project is “operationalizing”,
described by literary critic Franco Moretti as “the process whereby concepts are trans-
formed into a series of operations—which, in their turn, allow [us] to measure all sorts of
28Date: 2015; Publication Information: Sep/Oct2012, Vol. 123 Issue 3/4, p90-113. 24p.; Title: 12:03 P.M.;
Author: Lupoff, Richard A.; Source: FIC: Fantasy & Science Fiction.
29The entailment test is clearly described in Frana (2017, p.2), and we are borrowing her exposition here,
with only slight modification to her examples. She also provides an overview of different semantic treatments
of concealed questions.
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objects”—in other words, figuring out a way to tie a concept like “propositional knowl-
edge” to something we can algorithmically find and count (Moretti, 2013). Identifying
and counting the different uses of [know] proves difficult to operationalize. The most reli-
able approach is simply to take a representative sample and hand code each occurrence of
[know].30
5 Lessons from a hand-coded sample of 500 occurrences of [know]
We hand coded a random sample of 500 occurrences of [know]. Our classifications of the
sample, in decreasing order of frequency, go as follows:31
1. Discourse markers 164 (32.8%)
2. Propositional knowledge 113 (22.6%)
3. Knowledge-wh 101 (20.2%)
4. Knowledge-pp (prepositional phrase) 52 (10.4%)
5. Objectual knowledge 37 (7.4%)
6. Concealed questions 18 (3.6%)
7. Miscellaneous 15 (3.0%)
The most frequent occurrence of [know] in the sample (roughly 1/3) were discourse
markers (we will discuss discourse markers in detail below, in §5.1). Occurrences of
propositional knowledge (which feature either a “that” clause or a sentential complement
of [know]) were roughly as frequent as occurrences of know-wh (which includes “[know]-
if”). Occurrences of objectual knowledge are roughly as frequent as [know] + a preposi-
tional phrase (“known as”, “know about”, e.g.). Least frequent were concealed question
occurrences of [know]. Finally, the “miscellaneous” category includes both occurrences
of [know] that couldn’t be disambiguated, given the context provided by the corpus (that
includes cases of objectual vs. concealed question readings), and what seem like idiomatic
uses of [know] (“for all I know”).
The straightforward exercise of coding a random sample of [know] raises a couple of
philosophically interesting questions:
• What is the significance of the relative preponderance of discourse marking uses of
[know] for our understanding of the meaning of [know] in general?
• How should we understand the category of [know] + prepositional phrase? This is a
category that philosophers have not devoted any attention to analyzing, even though
it occurs roughly as frequently as objectual knowledge.
30For a methodologically similar combination of linguistic corpora and qualitative judgment/coding, see
the investigation of verbs of perception in San Roque et al. 2015.
31The sample is available to download here: https://www.dropbox.com/s/
xyplzq1q55x0yja/500sample.xlsx?dl=0
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Figure 2: % of overall occurrences of [know] for each each classification (from a random
sample of 500 occurrences of [know]). Error bars represent the 95% confidence interval of
the proportion.
5.1 Discourse marker occurrences of [know] and meanings of [know]
Discourse markers are expressions, such as “I mean”, “well”, and “like”, whose function
is to “[monitor] discourse and conversation in various ways” (Erman, 2001, p. 1339), and
which are both “syntactically optional in the sense that removal of a DM [discourse marker]
does not alter the grammaticality of its host sentence”, and “contribute nothing to the truth-
conditions of the proposition expressed by an utterance” (Schourup, 1999, pp. 231–232).
The following example illustrate these features of discourse markers:
(11) Zelda: Are you from Philadelphia?
Sally: Well I grew up out in the suburbs. And then I lived for about seven
years up in upstate New York. And then I came back here t’go to college.
(Schiffrin, 1987, p. 106)
“Well” can be deleted from Sally’s utterance without altering the grammaticality or truth
conditions of what she says, but it is not conversationally superfluous. According to
Schiffrin’s (1987) account, Sally’s use of “well” in (11) marks a response to a question
that is not “fully consonant” with the expectations of the questioner, by rejecting the as-
sumption that “Are you from Philadelphia?” has a binary answer (p. 106).
There is a substantial literature examining the discourse marking role of “you know”
(O¨stman, 1981; Schourup, 1985; Schiffrin, 1987; Erman, 2001). Schourup (1985) gives an
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account of the “core meaning” of “you know” in its discourse marking role in terms of the
speaker’s interest in ensuring that the audience grasps the speaker’s intended message:
[Uses of “you know” in its discourse marking role] represent discourse situa-
tions in which a speaker might wish to check up on the correspondence of his
or her own communicative aims to what the addressee has been able to grasp
from what has been said. (p. 128)
The great frequency of [“you know” in its discourse marking role] in conver-
sation is predictable from its core use. It appears in so many different places
because this use is appropriate at any point at which the speaker is unsure of
how well s/he is coming across. (p. 139)
Discourse marker uses of [know] are the most common occurrence of [know] in spoken
English, and yet this type of use has not received any attention from philosophers (with
the single exception of a brief mention in one footnote in Predelli 2013, p. 68 n. 13).
Philosophers’ near-exclusive attention to propositional content tends to make the variety of
things we can do with [know] invisible, but a quick look at a corpus snaps those background
features of language back into focus.
The prevalence of discourse marking uses of [know] might be taken to lend further
support to an argument against the use of ordinary language in epistemology expounded
by Hazlett (2010). Hazlett observes that non-factive uses of [know] can occur in non-
philosophical conversations without any sense of unacceptability, as in the following ex-
ample:
(12) Everyone knew that stress caused ulcers, before two Australian doctors in the early
80s proved that ulcers are actually caused by bacterial infection. (Hazlett, 2010,
p. 501)32
Hazlett argues that the apparent acceptability of non-factive uses of [know] in ordinary
talk means that the ordinary concept of knowledge, which guides non-philosophers’ use of
[know], is not the same as the concept of knowledge that is of interest to epistemologists,
which is factive. He concludes that “traditional epistemology shouldn’t be especially inter-
ested in the concept of knowledge that serves as the meaning of ‘knows’ in ordinary talk”
(Hazlett, 2010, p. 499). (Of course, one might instead—like Baz—agree with Hazlett that
there’s a difference between ordinary uses of [know] and philosophers’ uses of [know], and
conclude instead that it is the concept associated with the philosophers’ use that is of less
interest.)
Given the frequency of discourse marking uses of [know], one could construct a very
similar argument that ordinary language occurrences of [know] shouldn’t be used in the-
orizing about knowledge, since the meaning of [know] includes uses that clearly are not
32Bach (2005a, p. 62) also observes that ordinary uses of “know” sometimes look non-factive: “For in-
stance, we all know people who insist that they ‘knew’ things that they now acknowledge to be false. So does
knowledge not even entail truth?”
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“genuine references to knowing” (to use Nagel’s phrase), but rather play a role in structur-
ing and monitoring discourse. It would, therefore, be a mistake to look at ordinary use as
a guide to what the philosophically interesting notion of knowledge is. We think, however,
that such an argument isn’t convincing.
As discussed above, in §3, there is cross-linguistic evidence that English [know] has
different meanings when it refers to propositional knowledge and objectual knoweldge.
Other languages distinguish meanings of [know] that English lumps together. And there
are similar cross-linguistic reasons in favor of thinking that discourse marking uses of
[know] don’t mean the same thing as propositional occurrences of [know]. While there
is evidence that [know], with its propositional meaning, is a linguistic universal (Goddard
and Wierzbicka, 1994; Wierzbicka, 1996), the discourse marking use of [know] is variable
across languages, indicating that it has a different meaning in English than the propositional
meaning of [know].33 For example, Magnigova´ (2016, pp. 60–61) surveys different trans-
lations of the discourse marker “you know” into Czech, and finds that while a majority of
discourse marking uses are translated with the Czech equivalent of “know”, there is also a
great deal of variety that tracks the different types of discourse marking function that “you
know” can play:
(13) You know, it looked sorta funny.
Vypadalo to strasˇneˇ srandovneˇ, cha´pesˇ? (cha´pesˇ = you see)
(14) Still, you take what you can get, you know?
Cˇloveˇk holt musı´ vzı´t zavdeˇk tı´tm, co je po ruce, zˇe ano. (zˇe ano = am I right?)
(15) “Guys like Barry, they have so much rage against women, you know.”
“Chlapi jako Barry v sobeˇ dusı´ morˇe nena´visti k zˇena´m, co?” (co? = is that right?)
(16) You know, this restaurant does have an indoor section.
Hele’, tahle restaurace ma´ stolky i uvnitrˇ. (heled = look)
This supports the claim made in Chaume (2004, p. 843), that “In general, there is no one-
to-one correspondence between two languages in the field of discourse markers”.
The fact that [know] appears to have different meanings in its objectual, propositional,
and discourse marking forms means that it is a relatively straightforward exercise to ex-
clude the non-propositional meanings of [know] when investigating whether the meaning
associated with the propositional use of [know] corresponds with the concept of knowl-
edge of interest to epistemologists. The prevalence of discourse marking uses of [know] in
33For a discussion of some evidence in favor of thinking that the propositional meaning of [know] is a
linguistic universal, see Nagel (2017, p. 10): “The World Loanword Database, which covers 41 languages
from all inhabited continents, lists words meaning know and think (both in the sense embedding a proposi-
tional complement) in every language (Haspelmath & Tadmor, 2009). . . Verbs meaning know and think. . . not
only seem to appear in all languages but are heavily used across languages, appearing among the thirty most
common verbs in languages as diverse as Arabic (Buckwalter & Parkinson, 2014), Mandarin Chinese (Xiao,
Rayson, & McEnery, 2009), and Russian (Sharoff, Umanskaya, & Wilson, 2014)”. For an interesting dis-
cussion of the relative frequency of [know] and [think] across languages, see Wierzbicka (2006, pp. 34–41).
Thanks to Mark Dingemanse for bringing this discussion to our attention.
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non-philosophical talk therefore doesn’t threaten ordinary language approaches in episte-
mology.
5.2 [Know] + prepositional phrase
The second interesting fact that jumps out of the sample of [know] is the existence of a
reasonably common category of complements of [know] that, as far as we can tell, has
never been discussed by philosophers, namely [know] + a prepositional phrase. The most
common occurrences of [Know]+pp in the sample are the following:
1. known as 25 (48.1%)
2. know about 14 (26.9%)
3. known for 6 (11.5%)
4. known about 3 (5.7%)
5. known to 1 (1.9%)
6. knew of 1 (1.9%)
7. knows about 1 (1.9%)
8. knew about 1 (1.9%)
Some of these phrases are clearly not what Nagel calls “genuine references to know-
ing”. “Known as”, for example, is used as a way of talking about what something is called,
as in (17):
(17) His body was thrown into Pamlico Sound, his head given as a trophy to Spotswood,
who had it displayed on a tall pole in Hampton Roads, at a site now known as
Blackbeard’s Point.34
Similarly, “known for” is used not to refer to knowledge, but to indicate what properties
are commonly associated with the subject (see (18)).
(18) Dr. Allan Armitage is well known for his books, articles and lectures, all of which
are delivered in his engaging and accessible style.35
In contrast, “[know] about” refers to some body of propositional knowledge. In (19),
the speaker is saying that we know some fact or facts about the negotiations (we know that
the negotiations exist, e.g.).
(19) But I just want to say what we know about the negotiations, Chris, at this point is
that serious issues or yes, the centrifuges, the quality of the uranium and so forth,
but the sanctions are — I’m told by people watching this closely, what is really
holding this up at this point.36
34Date 2014 Publication information Feb2014, Vol. 44 Issue 10, p32-41. 10p. Title The Last Days of
BLACKBEARD Author WOODARD, COLIN; Source MAG: Smithsonian
35Date 2014 Publication information Jul/Aug2014, Vol. 111 Issue 4, p58-61. 4p. Title THE DIGITAL
TOOL SHED Author Shinn, Meghan; Source MAG: Horticulture
36Date 2015 (150322) Title Interview with John Brennan Source SPOK: Fox
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“Known to” and “knew of” also both seem to be “genuine references to knowing”. “Known
to” can take either a verb phrase or a noun phrase as its object. When something is “known
to” do something, there is some action that is generally known that the subject performs—
so “known to” plausibly refers to a body of propositional knowledge concerning the subject
and that action. When “known to” is followed by a noun phrase, it refers to objectual
knowledge (see 20)). “Knew of” also appears to refer to objectual knowledge (see (21)).
(20) The technique known as spoofing exploited a vulnerability known to the U.S. mil-
itary.
(21) In the 1920’s the great majority of American Protestants knew of Buddhism only
vaguely.
6 Evaluating the Bach and Baz frequency claims
Now that we have a better map of how [know] is ordinarily used, and types of questions the
corpus enables us to answer, we can return to the frequency claims made by Bach (2005)
and Baz (2012) that we quoted at the beginning of the paper, and determine whether we
have the resources to verify whether or not they are true.
6.1 Bach
Let’s start by examining the passage from Bach (2005):
Also, it is worth keeping in mind that most of the time, outside of epistemol-
ogy, when we consider whether somebody knows something, we are mainly in-
terested in whether the person has the information, not in whether the person’s
belief rises to the level of knowledge. Ordinarily we do not already assume that
they have a true belief and just focus on whether or not their epistemic posi-
tion suffices for knowing. Similarly, when we say that someone does not know
something, typically we mean that they don’t have the information. (Bach,
2005a, pp. 62–63)37
One immediate difficulty in verifying Bach’s claims using linguistic corpora is the fact
that he doesn’t initially limit the scope of his claims to uses of language—his initial topic
is “when we consider whether someone knows something. . . ”, which would include both
talk and thought. Obviously linguistic corpora will not give us the resources to evaluate
non-linguistic instances of considering whether someone knows something. But in the
final sentence of the passage, he makes a claim specifically about language: “When we
37For some agreement with Bach about ordinary positive knowledge assessments, see Sripada and Stanley
(2012, p. 7): “In many contexts, all we care about is that an agent had a true belief, or that the content
of the knowledge is true. In such contexts, we don’t care about the justificatory or basing requirements of
knowledge—we care only about its factivity, i.e. that knowledge entails truth. So we are led to grant that
someone knows something even though they clearly do not satisfy anything beyond the truth or true belief
requirements of knowledge”.
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say that someone does not know something, typically we mean that they don’t have the
information”, so we will concentrate on whether the corpus can help us verify that claim.
First, we need to figure out what it means to “have the information”. In the broader con-
text of Bach’s article, he is discussing propositional knowledge, and in the quoted passage
he talks about the propositional attitude of belief, so it is reasonable to assume that he is
concerned with the state of having information that a proposition is true (rather than, e.g.,
having information that constitutes a relation of acquaintance to an object). In a personal
communication, Bach said “by ‘having the information’ I just meant (truly) believing that
P”.38 So Bach’s claim is that when we say that someone doesn’t know that p, we typically
mean that they don’t have a true belief that p.
Second, now that we have a better idea of what Bach’s claim is, we need to collect the
relevant occurrences of cases of “say[ing] that someone does not know something” (where
“something” refers to a proposition) before we can verify whether or not it’s correct. We
can do that by searching the corpus for “[do] not know that”, which finds occurrences
of “did not know that”, “do not know that”, and “does not know that”. There are 795
occurrences of those phrases as in COCA as a whole, which break down as follows:
1. did not know that 536
2. do not know that 176
3. does not know that 83
We can now formulate a question precise enough that the corpus will enable us to
answer it. Within this set of knowledge denials, are knowledge denials in which a subject
has a true belief that p, but is said not to know that p more or less common than knowledge
denials in which a subject simply lacks a true belief that p?
We examined a random sample of 100 occurrences of “[do] not know that”.39 The vast
majority of sampled knowledge denials (97/100) do not conflict with Bach’s claim that
non-philosophical denials of knowledge are denials that the subject has a true belief that p.
As an illustration, consider the following example, drawn from the random sample:
(22) KING: Help our memory. How did they enlist you to serve? Countess of Ro-
manones: Well, I had been trying to get into things like Jacqueline Cochran’s flying
group—training program—but I was 20 years old and you had to be 25. I happened
to mention this on a blind date in New York; did not know that the man who was
my blind date was the head of secret intelligence for Portugal and Spain. And
they found that I was perhaps the kind of a girl that could go in there and infilter
[sic] into Spanish society KING: You had to kill a man once, didn’t you? Count-
ess of Romanones: Yes, I did. I did KING: Our guest is Aline, the Countess of
38Bach’s notion of “having the information” is similar to the notion of a “reality congruent” informational
state, which includes both true beliefs and knowledge. See Song and Baillargeon (2008, p. 1789), for exam-
ple. This notion is discussed in Nagel (2017).
39The sample is available to download here: https://www.dropbox.com/s/
xyplzq1q55x0yja/500sample.xlsx?dl=0
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Romanones; her third book, The Spy Wore Silk, about a thwarted attempt of the
assassination of the. . . 40
The knowledge denial in this passage is not a case of the Countess of Romanones pos-
sessing a true belief that the man who was her blind date was the head of secret intelli-
gence for Portugal and Spain, while lacking sufficient evidence for that belief to count as
knowledge—there’s no indication that the countess had any suspicion that her blind date
was head of secret intelligence for Portugal and Spain.
Out of the random sample of 100 knowledge denials we examined, only one is a poten-
tial example of a subject being said not to know that p while she has a true belief that p,
from a work of fiction set in the Star Trek universe. The remaining couple of examples fall
into one of the following categories:
• anaphoric uses of “[do] not know that” that refer to earlier cases of know-wh:
(23) “What this bill attempts to do—and it may not be perfect, and we know
that—is to fix the broken borders, provide the interior enforcement, see that
agriculture has a regular supply of labor, and provide a pathway to legal-
ization so that the Homeland Security Department knows by photograph, by
biometric identification who is in this country. We do not know that now”.41
• uses of “[do] not know that. . . ” that are part of a reference to objectual knowledge:
(24) “What could the cosmos need from or require of us? What sort of responsi-
bilities flow from the idea that we all mirror the cosmos? What does it mean
to say that the whole history of the cosmos is within a particular human be-
ing? I, for one, do not know that whole history, and I do not see how cosmic
anchoring shows how my puny deeds will have cosmic significance”.42
Why is it that the overwhelming majority of propositional knowledge denials are used to
communicate that the target agent does not believe the proposition in question? (A referee
observes that most epistemologists would probably find this fact “bizarre”.) That is, given
that speakers could accurately describe such agents as not believing or thinking that p,
why do speakers tend to describe such agents as not knowing that p instead? We think the
explanation involves speakers simultaneously aiming to “maximize presupposition” (Heim,
1991) on one hand, and aiming to avoid generating a false implicature on the other hand.43
Consider the following two facts: (i) saying “S does not know that p” presupposes that p,
so speakers can use such a sentence to add the proposition p to the conversational common
ground; while (ii) a speaker who says “S does not believe/think that p” does not presuppose
p, and tends to implicate that S believes/thinks not-p, as in (25).
40Date 1991 (19910322) Title Ed Bradley - The News Business Source SPOK: CNN King
41Date 2007 (20070626) Title Senate Votes for Cloture on Immigration Bill Source SPOK: PBS Newshour
42Date 1997 (Winter) Publication information Winter97, Vol. 26 Issue 1, p27, 8p Title Havel’s postmodern
view of man in the cosmos. Author Lawler, Peter Augustine Source ACAD: Perspectives on Political Science
43Thanks to Emmanuel Chemla for discussion of this issue.
20
Figure 3: % occurrences of types of knowledge denials (“[do] not know that”), from a
random sample of 100 occurrences in COCA. Error bars represent the 95% confidence
interval of the proportion. * “Miscellaneous” includes (i) anaphoric uses of “[do] not know
that” that refer to earlier cases of know-wh; (ii) cases of “[do] not know that” that form part
of denials of objectual knowledge.
(25) BUCKLEY: Well, this was — these were comments that came aboard Air Force
One as the president was traveling up here. Ari Fleischer asked by reporters about
it. Ari Fleischer saying that for the first time, that the president is saying that
what Lott said was wrong. It’s the first time that the administration is quoting the
president as saying that what Trent Lott said was wrong. But they’ve also said that
Lott has apologized, and the president does not think that Lott should resign.44
The use of the final sentence in (25) implicates that the president thinks that Lott should
not resign. (This is an example of the phenomenon of “neg-raising”—see Horn 1989 for
extensive discussion.)
Suppose one wants to communicate that p is the case and that S doesn’t have the belief
that p. Saying “S doesn’t believe/think that p, but p” is not an effective way of doing
that, because using such a sentence would typically implicate that S believes that not-p. In
contrast, saying “S doesn’t know that p” is an efficient way of communicating that p, and
it leaves open whether S doesn’t know that p because S doesn’t believe that p or because S
believes that p, but lacks sufficient evidence to count as knowing that p. But it’s typically
not hard to tell, in contexts like (22), which of those two more specific propositions the
speaker intends to communicate by saying “S doesn’t know that p”. This combination of
44Date 2002 (20021212) Title Iraq Terror Connection? Source SPOK: CNN Iraq
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presupposition and implicature explains why speakers can use “S doesn’t know that p” to
communicate that S doesn’t believe that p, but p.
The evidence from the corpus that we gathered therefore appears to support Bach’s
claim about typical uses of knowledge denials outside of philosophy. But that appearance
is misleading, for the following reason: Any piece of evidence that is compatible with
Bach’s view that ordinary uses of “S does not know that p” are typically used to deny that
S has a true belief that p is also compatible with the competing view that ordinary uses of
“S does not know that p” are used to deny that S has a justified true belief that p. That’s
because lacking a true belief that p is a way of lacking a justified true belief that p, so any
evidence of the former will also be evidence of the latter. So what we have really found is
evidence that fails to disconfirm both Bach’s view and the standard view that is his target.
And after examining the corpus to try to find evidence in support of Bach’s frequency claim,
it becomes clear that the only corpus-based evidence that would tip the balance between
Bach’s claim and his opponent would be the typicality of uses of “S does not know that p”
that allow that the subject has a true belief that p, but denies knowledge on the grounds of
lack of justification, which would show that Bach’s claim is mistaken. But we found that
that type of use of “S doesn’t know that p” is rare.
To be clear, Bach’s claim is only about what is most typical, not that ordinary speakers
wouldn’t be able to use knowledge denials in a way that acknowledges even a true belief
might not count as knowledge. But the upshot of our failure to verify Bach’s frequency
claim is that he is in no better an epistemic position than we are in respect to this claim—so
it’s not something he is in a position to assert.
6.2 Baz
Now let’s consider Baz’s (2012) frequency claim about “I know that such and such”:
‘I know that such and such’ is far more commonly used in situations in which
the obtaining of such and such is not in question and no one is in need of being
assured of it. Think, for example, of the ‘I know’ of sharing a reaction to a
piece of purported news, or the ‘I know’ of acknowledging a significant fact.
(Baz, 2012, p. 40)
The context in which Baz’s frequency claim appears is a discussion of Austin’s (1946)
treatment of first-personal knowledge claims as performing a specific kind of speech act,
namely the act of giving an assurance that something is the case. Austin compares the
speech act of giving an assurance by making a knowledge claim with the speech act of
promising. In both cases we do more than describe ourselves—we take “a new plunge”
and give others a guarantee of something. On one recent account of assuring, the guarantee
the speaker makes is that she has conclusive reasons in favor of the truth of the proposition
assured (Lawlor, 2013). Baz describes the conditions required for successfully performing
an assurance as follows:
The use of ‘I know (that such and such)’ on which Austin focuses would be
natural only in situations where the claim that such and such is grounded in
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some sort of expertise, as for example when the claimer is an expert in iden-
tifying birds, or perhaps in identifying some particular person’s moods. More
generally, this use would be in place where the other is for some reason not in
a position to assess one’s basis. (Baz, 2012, p. 40)45
Baz gives the following two examples to illustrate “sharing a reaction to a piece of
purported news” and “acknowledging a significant fact”, both of which are uses of “I know”
that do not perform Austinian assurances (p. 40 n. 38-39):
(26) ‘Jack and Jill are getting married!’ ‘I know!’ (with a tone of excitement, or, alter-
natively, with a sigh).
(27) ‘I know he is angry with me; I just haven’t had the time to speak with him about
what happened’.
In order to verify Baz’s claim using COCA we need to look at a sample of propositional
occurrences of “I know”, both occurrences that have explicit “that” clauses and those that
lack them. “I know” is a relatively frequent phrase in COCA, occurring 100,298 times. We
collected a random sample of 100 propositional occurrences of “I know”, and hand coded
them as either cases of assurances or non-assurances.46 There is no algorithmic procedure
for classifying the examples—it required making judgments about the “total speech act
in the total speech situation”.47 Here are paradigmatic examples of assurances and non-
assurances drawn from the sample:
Assurances
(28) “I was having dinner with my own father a year after the war started in Iraq, and
I said something that even raised a question about whether this was the right thing
to do or not,” Morell recalls. “My father slammed his hand down on the table until
the silverware jumped off, and he said, ‘But Iraq did 9/11!’ I said, ‘No, they didn’t,
Dad. I know. Trust me. I know.’”48
(29) Price is listed as the executive on a handful of inactive Louisiana businesses, in-
cluding Street Life Entertainment, which Bryson Scott, who also is listed as an
45Baz (2012, p. 40) claims that Austin, “taking his cue from the tradition’s obsession with knowledge as
that which supposedly puts one in a position to give assurance. . . ignores such situations [situations in which
‘I know’ is not used to make assurances]”. It is improbable that an acute observer of language (as Austin was)
would be unaware that there are non-assurance uses of [know], since those uses are indeed quite common.
46This sample is available to download here: https://www.dropbox.com/s/
xyplzq1q55x0yja/500sample.xlsx?dl=0
47There is a possibility of bias given that the authors, rather than neutral coders, were coding the data. But
in the cases where we approached the data with particular expectations, namely in the evaluation of the Bach
and Baz claims, we found the opposite of our expectations, which should alleviate worries of the potential
effects of bias somewhat. We have also provided links to the central samples to allow readers to evaluate our
classifications.
48Date 2015 (150511) Publication information NEWS; Pg. 1A Title CIA vet: War far as I can see; U.S.
has not done well in subduing the Islamic State Author Susan Page Source NEWS: USA Today
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executive for the company, said was a record label. Scott identified himself as
a rapper and said Price handled publicity. Scott also said he met Leonard Four-
nette during a barbecue at Price’s house when Fournette was playing football at St.
Augustine High School in New Orleans. “I know they were trying to run the
BUGA Nation campaign,” Scott said. Court records in Ascension Parish, where
Price lives, show he has faced three civil lawsuits alleging unpaid credit card bills
in recent years. Stumph said IWD Agency spoke to Lory Fournette only once, and
Stumph said she met Leonard Fournette during a chance encounter in Baton Rouge.
“He seemed very happy with the website and all the products,” Stumph said.49
Non-assurances
(30) BEHAR: I see. Now, youre going to—theres a movie, I heard, that they might be
making, a Lifetime movie about this story? C-SAVAGE: Yes. S-SAVAGE: Yes.
BEHAR: Whos playing you, Meryl Streep, I see her. C-SAVAGE: Im going to
play me and George Clooney is going to play Sean. BEHAR: Brilliant casting.
C-SAVAGE: I know. I thought so.50
(31) . . . the Republican National Committeeman there, a guy named Mickey Barnett, is
calling for a hand recount. He said: “I just don’t believe 700 people went to the
polls and did not vote for president.” That sounds a little familiar. From what you
were just telling me about the 1 percent, 2 percent that don’t vote for president,
perhaps you should call Mickey Barnett in New Mexico. I’m not sure what the
area code is there, but how do you reconcile those two completely contradictory
points of view? I know you don’t think it’s hypocrisy, so please explain it to me.
I’m really confused.51
All of the assurances shared with (28-29) the feature that the speaker had some exper-
tise or special access to the fact being reported, in accordance with Baz’s characterization
of Austin’s speech act of assurance. It also didn’t appear to be the case, in any of the ex-
amples classified as assurances, that the addressee of the speech act already believed the
proposition being reported. The proportions of assurances, non-assurances, and cases that
we were uncertain how to classify are as follows:
Non-assurances: 62/100
Assurances: 33/100
Uncertain: 5/100
(See Figure 4)
49Date 2015 (151106) Publication information SPORTS; Pg. 1C Title Did Fournette’ss family commit
NCAA violation?; BUGA Nation merchandise site raises questions Author Josh Peter, @joshlpeter11, USA
TODAY Sports Source NEWS: USA Today
50Date 2011 (110215) Title Did ‘Hanna Montana’ Destroy Cyrus Family?; In Vitro Mix-up Nightmare;
Interview With Julianne Moore Source SPOK: JOY BEHAR SHOW 10:00 PM EST
51Date 2000 (20001207) Title Will Florida’s Courts Have the Final Say in the Presidential Election? Source
SPOK: CNN Crossfire
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Baz’s claim that non-assurance uses of “I know. . . ” are “far more common” than as-
surance uses is backed up by this sample (assuming that having slightly less than twice as
many in this sample is a way of satisfying “far more common”).
Figure 4: % of occurrences of “I [know]” that are assurances vs. non-assurances. From
a random sample of 100 occurrences in COCA. Error bars represent the 95% confidence
interval of the proportion.
7 Conclusion: Corpora, methodological hygiene, and ordinary language
We began this study with a suspicion, based on the unreliability of armchair frequency
judgments, that Bach and Baz were wrong about their characterizations of what the typ-
ical and more common uses of knowledge denials and “I know such and such” are. It
turned out, however, that random samples drawn from COCA did not show that their arm-
chair judgments were false. We found evidence that supports Baz’s claim that uses of “I
know. . . ” are more frequently used to make non-assurances than assurances, and we failed
to disconfirm Bach’s claim that ordinary uses of “I do not know that p” are simply denials
that S has a true belief that p. Though we didn’t show that the content of either claim was
false, we submit that neither Bach nor Baz had sufficient evidence to count as knowing that
their frequency claims were correct, and so neither was in a position (prior to this study)
to assert the frequency claims that they made.52 Moreover, since we also failed to discon-
firm the hypothesis that Bach is arguing against—ordinary uses of the sentence “S does not
52For a similar worry about justification for armchair judgments about knowledge, see Hansen (2012,
2013), and a subsequent study (Hansen and Chemla, 2013) that indicates that such armchair judgments are in
fact in line with judgments collected in a formal experiment.
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know that p” are used to deny that S has a justified true belief that p—our evidence doesn’t
put Bach a position to assert that his frequency claim is correct.
In addition to addressing general worries about the reliability and verifiability of arm-
chair frequency judgments, looking at samples drawn from linguistic corpora can reveal
new facts about the way linguistic expressions are used that have so far flown below
philosophers’ radar. For example, while philosophers have devoted a great deal of attention
to knowledge-that, knowledge-wh, and objectual knowledge, so far they have not discussed
cases of knowledge + prepositional phrase complements. A cursory look at occurrences of
[know] in COCA reveals that such occurrences are roughly as frequent as occurrences of
objectual knowledge. And most striking of all, philosophers have so far not discussed dis-
course marking uses of [know], even though such uses are the most frequent occurrences
of [know] in COCA.
When J.L. Austin begins his ordinary language investigation of the meaning of the
expressions “intentionally” and “deliberately”, he says that the first step is to “consider
some cases” of how those expressions are used. He mentions the possibility of looking at
actual cases in which those expressions are used, before dismissing that option in favor of
imagined cases:
First let us consider some cases. Actual cases would of course be excellent: we
might observe what words have actually been used by commentators on real
incidents, or by narrators of fictitious incidents. However, we do not have the
time or space to do that here. We must instead imagine some cases. . . (Austin,
1966, p. 429)
Austin was aware of, through contact with Arne Naess and other mid-century practitioners
of “empirical semantics” and “occurrence analysis” (a forerunner of corpus linguistics) that
extensive examination of actual cases was possible (Chapman, 2011, 2014; Hansen, 2017;
Murphy, 2015). But Austin’s consideration of actual cases is limited to his discussion of the
case of Regina vs. Finney, in which the defendant, Finney, is convicted of manslaughter for
scalding one of the mental patients under his care to death in a bath (Austin, 1957).53 And
there is reason to think that Austin was actually suspicious of the experimental and corpus-
based methods of the empirical semantics movement (Chapman 2014; Longworth 2017;
Murphy 2015). In contrast to Austin’s stance, we have aimed to show how a convincing and
empirically grounded ordinary language approach to the investigation of lexical meaning
should not ignore “what words have actually been used by commentators on real incidents”
as a supplement to, and check on, philosophers’ judgments of what sorts of uses of language
are the most common, ordinary, or typical.
53There is a criticism of Austin’s methods, written around the same time as “Three Ways of Spilling
Ink” was published (in which Austin’s remark about not having the time or space to consider “actual cases”
appears), that argues Austin’s “intuitive” method of considering imaginary cases needs to be supplemented
with a survey of “texts of actual language (spoken and written)” (New, 1966, p. 374).
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8 Appendix: Examples of philosophers making armchair frequency claims about
language (drawn from JSTOR)
“most commonly we use” / “most commonly used”
I think myself that we very rarely, if ever, use observe in ordinary language
in connection with the senses except in connection with the sense of sight, to
mean either see or look at. Also I think that perceive is most commonly used
as a rather formal synonym for notice. (Barnes, 1954, p. 263)
The same kind of analysis can be applied to the rather difficult example of
‘believing in oneself’. Most commonly we use this phrase in a negative form.
The trouble with Tom is that he does not believe in himself: he will never make
a success in his life. (Price, 1965, p. 19)
“we typically mean” / “typically we mean”
We do find it natural to utter such a sentence as ‘Sarah’s reason for deciding to
enter the room was that she wanted to get her glasses’, but typically we mean
by this just that Sarah decided to enter the room in order to get her glasses, i.e.,
that what she decided was: to enter the room in order to get her glasses, i.e.,
that her reason for entering the room was part of the content of the intention
formed by her decision. What we typically mean by ‘the reason for which
S decided to do A’ is the reason for which, according to the intention formed
in the decision, S will do A when and if she carries out the decision. (Ginet,
2008, p. 233)
When we say that a decision is good, we typically mean that it is good qua
decision. (Hansson, 2006, p. 426)
Consider what we typically mean when we say someone is acting in a child-
ish way or when oppressed groups claim they are being treated like children.
We are asserting that childishness is the opposite of the desired state of adult
responsibility. (Kulynych, 2001, p. 257)
What we typically mean by ‘self-consciousness’ or ‘self-awareness’ is more
complex: it involves an awareness of oneself as a subject of experience, with
unified mental states, who persists through various changes. (Stone, 2001,
p. 198 n. 11)
“we most commonly mean”
One thing making this example difficult, however, is what we most commonly
mean when we speak of wondering if there is a pain: when we wonder this we
do try to detect or become aware of a pain by means of a sensation, or else, as
in the first example, to analyze the sensations we are already aware of having.
(Newton, 1989, p. 586)
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“we ordinarily mean” / “ordinarily we mean”
Now, when we ask, ‘What makes a pumpkin yellow?’ do we really have in
mind a causal kind of question? Are we in other words, asking: what causes the
pumpkin to be yellow? What can the answer to this question be? Ordinarily,
we mean, I should say: what makes the pumpkin yellow is simply the fact that
it possesses the property, color, yellow. (Mitias, 1982, p. 159)
He certainly cannot mean what we ordinarily mean by ‘human being’, since
what we ordinarily mean, if indeed there is any definite meaning at all, is
‘human organism’, ‘member of the species homo sapiens’. (Oderberg, 1989,
p. 138)
In saying that it is within one’s power to bring about a situation we ordinarily
mean that he has the requisite skills and resources, that no one has bound him
hand and foot to prevent his so doing, and so on. (Saunders, 1962, p. 30)
We begin by seeing whether there is a rational procedure for settling moral
conflicts, or whether good reasons can be given for justifying moral beliefs, or
whether there is a reasonable way of arriving at a moral decision. What does
this mean? It means what we ordinarily mean by using the terms ‘rational’,
‘good reasons’, and ‘reasonable’. (Taylor, 1954, p. 516)
If the justification the philosopher looks for is not what we ordinarily mean
by ‘justification’ then the products of his search cannot have the sort of signif-
icance they would have if it were. (Vesey, 1954, p. 226)
I think they both mean by ‘can’ what we ordinarily mean. And what we
ordinarily mean when we say that someone can do something is that she has
both the ability and the opportunity to do it. (Vihvelin, 1996, p. 318)
This experience is not the whole of what we mean when we say we see some-
thing, because ordinarily we mean also to imply that that thing is before us.
(Wolgast, 1960, p. 166)
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